Displaced workers in the Netherlands by Abbring, J.H. et al.
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometric
Serie research memoranda
Displaced Workers in the Netherlands
Jaap H. Abbring
Gerard J. van den Berg
Pieter A. Cautier
A. Cijsbert C. van Lomwel
Jan C. van Ours
July 1998
applied
labour
economics
research
team
Research Memorandum 1998-38
.
vrije Univers i te i t amsterdam
Displaced Workers in the Net herlands”
Jaap H. Abbring + Gerard J. van den Be&
Pieter A. Gautier 3 A. Gijsbert C. van Lomwell
Jan C. van Ourd
July 17, 1998
Abstract
This paper studies worker displacement in the Netherlands. We discuss the rel-
evant institutions,  and we analyze the incidence and consequences of displacement.
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1 Introduction
Worker displacement (i.e., job separations initiated by employers because of adverse eco-
nomic conditions) is an increasingly important phenomenon in the Netherlands. Dis-
placement rates have increased from around 4% in 1970 up to 11% in 1993.i  This report
discusses institutions that are relevant to worker displacement. In addition, we provide
an empirical analysis of the incidence of displacement, and the labor market transitions
and earnings changes induced by displacement in the Netherlands.
In our analyses of worker displacement we will usually identify displacement with
permanent layoffs. We will focus on workers with sufficient tenure, make comparisons with
experiences of low-tenure workers, and correct for separations that are worker-initiated.
The restriction to permanent layoffs is fairly irrelevant in the Netherlands. Temporary
layoffs and recall are rarely observed, and the Dutch institutions work against them. For
instance, arrangements for Unemployment Insurance (UI) provision to unemployed who
are laid off temporarily are restricted to very specific activities.2  Therefore, we focus on
tenure and cause of separation as defining characteristics of displacement.
We use three data sets: the Firm Employment (FE) data set, an administrative lon-
gitudinal UI data set (of the Dutch Social Security Council or SVr),  and the Labor Force
Survey of the OSA (LFS). The FE data set is constructed by sampling individuals from
administrative records of firms over the period 1992-1996, and provides information on
tenure and separations, reasons of separations, and a variety of individual and job charac-
teristics. The data provide very useful information on the incidence of displacement, and
shed some light on labor market transitions immediately following displacement. How-
ever, the FE data are silent about subsequent labor market transitions and earnings losses.
The UI data set provides information on unemployment spells of all workers entering UI
in 1992. As all unemployed workers in the market sector with sufficiently long employ-
ment records end up in UI, and as we furthermore observe an indicator of worker-initiated
separations in the data, these data can be used to study re-employment durations after
displacement, conditional on a positive non-employment spell. As we observe to some
extent the entire inflow into UI by sector, municipality and month, we can also construct
indicators of excessive inflow into UI, which can be seen as indicators of excessive, or even
mass, layoffs. Earnings losses are however not observed in this data set either. For this
we require the LFS data, a labor force panel survey covering the period 1985-1990. The
LFS data set provides extensive information on labor market transitions and earnings,
but suffers from small numbers of displaced workers.
In sum, the data allow for the analysis of the incidence of displacemen and of labor mar-
ket states occupied just after being displaced, and provide information on re-employment
‘See Subsection 4.1 for a discussion of displacement rate time series.
21t  is clear though that temporary layoffs may occur in some less organized way, for instance because
UI regulation does not fully prevent seasonally unemployed to enter UI. See Section 2 for institutional
details, and Section 4 for further discussion on the consequences for our analysis. Also, Emerson (1988)
discusses the role of temporary layoffs in various countries, among which the Netherlands and the US.
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durations for those with positive spells of joblessness. Also, the LFS data allow for a
rough estimate of earnings losses induced by displacement, and provide some information
on labor market states occupied some time after displacement.
Most of the literature on displacement is concerned with wage losses following dis-
placement. In The Netherlands, as in other European countries, displaced workers often
flow into unemployment. Unemployment durations are typically so long that one may
expect sorting and stigma effects to affect the labor market position of many unemployed
displaced workers. As a result, the difference between the pre-displacement wage and the
wage earned in the first job after displacement can be affected by factors that are not
due to displacement per se (see also Andersen, 1997). This hampers the interpretation
of empirical results on this wage difference. An additional empirical problem concerns
the fact that the post-displacement wage is unobserved if the unemployment duration is
right-censored.
If it is difficult to leave unemployment then employed workers have a relatively strong
incentive to prevent exit into unemployment. Workers in the Netherlands who expect
displacement therefore have a strong incentive to search actively for another job while
still employed. Some job-to-job transitions may therefore be the result of (anticipated)
displacement. Indeed, if unemployment durations are long then employment may be a
more important destination state following displacement. We return to these issues in the
empirical analyses below.
This paper will mainly focus on UI and, to a lesser extent, employment as exit states
for displaced workers. Although it could be argued that these cover a significant share
of displaced workers in the Netherlands, it is clear that alternative destinations may play
a role. In the 1970s and the 1980s  Disability Insurance (DI) allegedly has been used
as a convenient alternative to UI in case of separation of workers. Alternatively, early
retirement arrangements may have facilitated displacement of older workers. Although
both the FE and the LFS data sets provide at least some information on transitions from
employment into these alternative destinations, this information is not as rich as the in-
formation on unemployment spells. We will discuss institutional arrangements concerning
DI and early retirement in detail in Section 2. Also, we use results from existing empirical
work for the Netherlands to clarify the role of DI and early retirement beyond the limited
information offered by the FE and the LFS data in Section 7.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss institutions which are
relevant to displacement in the Netherlands, i.e. employment protection, social security,
and wage formation. Section 3 discusses the data sets we use for the analysis of (the
consequences of) displacement. Both time series and cross-sectional properties of dis-
placement rates are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses labor market transitions
following displacement. Some analyses of earnings changes induced by displacement are
presented in Section 6. In Section 7 we discuss the role of early retirement and DI. Section
8 concludes.
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2 Institutional setting
This section summarizes Dutch labor market institutions that are relevant to displace-
ment. We first review employment protection, proceed by discussing relevant elements of
social security, and finish by outlining wage setting institutions.
2.1 Employment protection
Employment relationships are arranged by either fixed term contracts or permanent con-
tracts. Fixed term contracts allow employers to lay off workers at the end of the contracted
period without prior notice or the need of having a permit, and therefore offer no em-
ployment protection to the employee. However, if the employee is allowed to continue to
work after the contracted period, or if a new (fixed term) contract is written within 31
days of the end date of the first contract, the employee is considered to be working on
a ‘continued contract’, which basically provides the protection of a permanent contract.3
We will discuss employment protection offered by such contracts next.
As long as workers and firms are bound by a contract, they can only separate after a
permit has been granted by a regional employment institution, a rule which is generally
applied to firm-initiated separations only. Employers always need a permit for dismissal
or layoff of workers, except if there is mutual agreement between the employer and the em-
ployee, in case of severe misconduct by the employee (like stealing), in case of bankruptcy
of the employer, or if the employment contract is dissolved by court. Permits are usually
granted for dismissal because of low performance of the employee, and for layoffs nec-
essary for business economic circumstances (displacement). Dismissal because of illness,
marriage, pregnancy and military service is prohibited. Both court cases and permits are
frequently used as ways to dissolve labor contracts.
Both employers and employees who want to end their employment relationship are
bound by mandatory advance notice requirements. Advance notice periods are always
less than 6 months. Exact durations depend on age, tenure and the type of contract
involved. In case of separation, advance notice periods start after a permit has been
granted, and equal, if not specified otherwise in the contract, as a rule the time between
two subsequent wage payments, which is usually 1 month. The employer is also obliged to
give advance notice of a number of weeks equal to the years of tenure, up to a maximum
of 13 weeks, with 1 additional week per year of tenure for employees of age 45-65, up to a
maximum of 26 weeks. Instead, advance notice periods can also be contracted. However,
it can never be excluded, nor can it exceed 6 months.
Only if a contract is dissolved by court, and the employee is not declared ‘responsible’,
severance pay can be granted, usually between 1 and 2 monthly salaries per year of tenure.
3Note  that employers have tried to avoid such ‘continued contracts’ in several ways, for instance by
offering new contracts after slightly more than 31 days, only. Although such contracts are not ‘continued
contacts’ formally, employees have been successful in fighting such contracting behavior in court. Also
note that currently laws are prepared that allow for more flexible fixed term contracting, offering less
protection to the employee.
2.2 Social security
From  the perspective of displacement of longer service workers in the private sector,
the most relevant element of Dutch social security is Unemployment Insurance (UI),
which is arranged according to the Unemployment Laws of 1949 and 1987 (which have
been revised again in the 1990s). We will describe its basic structure in 1992/1993,
for which we will use administrative data in this paper. A worker losing his job in
the Netherlands is entitled to UI benefits, provided some conditions are fulfilled. The
unemployed individual has to face a reduction in his original working hours of at least 5
hours per week, or half of the original working hours if less than 10 hours per week, he
should not get paid for this working hour reduction and he should be willing to accept a
new job. Furthermore, the unemployed individual should have had a job for at least 26
weeks in the past 52 weeks prior to the start of the unemployment period. Those who
fulfil  these conditions are entitled to wage-related initial benefits, and in some cases to
an extension of these benefits at a level related to the mandatory minimum wage. The
initial benefits amount to 70% of the gross wage in the last job before unemployment,
and are subject to income tax. The maximum duration of these benefits ranges from
6 months to 5 years, depending on the employment history of the unemployed.4  The
extended benefits are equal to 70% of the gross minimum wage or 70% of the gross
wage in the last job before unemployment, whichever is lower, and are again subject to
income tax. Unemployed who have had jobs in at least 3 out of the last 5 years are
eligible for extended benefits, for a maximum duration of one year, or sometimes longer
for older individuals. If, after the expiration of the unemployment insurance benefits, the
unemployed individual has not found a job, he may receive subsistence benefits (social
assistance), which are means (household income) tested and related to what is considered
to be the social minimum income. The Unemployment Law provides some arrangements
for ‘short time unemployment’ due to weather conditions, but no general arrangements
for temporary layoffs, which is, perhaps for that reason, not an important phenomenon
in the Netherlands (see also Emerson, 1988).
According to the Unemployment Law, an unemployed worker has several obligations
in order to be entitled to UI benefits: he has to (i) prevent unnecessary job loss, (ii) take
actions to prevent him from staying unemployed, so he has to search for a job and accept
appropriate job offers, register as a job searcher at the public employment office, partic-
ipate in education and training, etcetera, and (iii) keep the administrative organization
informed about everything that is relevant to the payment of the unemployment insurance
benefits. The administration of the unemployment benefits system is mainly organized at
the level of the industry. If an unemployed worker does not live up to the rules then the
administrative organization is authorized, but not obliged, to impose a sanction on that
worker.
4For  example, to get an initial benefits entitlement period of 5 years, the unemployed worker has to
have had jobs for at least 40 years and in at least 3 out of the last 5 years prior to the start of the
unemployment spell.
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Most displaced workers (in the private sector) can, to the extent that they do not
immediately move into new jobs, be identified as workers flowing into UI and not receiv-
ing sanctions for ‘unnecessary job loss’. Because of the institutional arrangements, this
definition restricts attention to both ‘longer service’ workers, although not necessarily
workers with long tenure on their last jobs, and to layoffs because of economic reasons.
However, especially during some periods in recent history, other social security schemes
have played a role as destinations for displaced workers.
Disability Insurance (DI) , arranged by a variety of laws from 1967 (referring to a law
from 1930),  1976, 1993, and revised throughout, is a well known alleged escape route for
displacement. 5 In the 1970s and 1980s DI was more attractive than UI for both employers
and employees in terms of replacement rates and, perhaps, stigma effects. Furthermore,
in 1990, there were 139 DI claimants to every 1,000 workers in the Netherlands, and only
78 in Sweden and 43 in Germany (Aarts,  Dercksen and De Jong, 1993). As Dutch workers
are not likely to run much higher health risks than workers in Sweden and Germany, this
suggests that Dutch DI serves more goals than just disability insurance.6  Policy changes in
the late 1980s and the 1990s have been directed at preventing abuse of DI. DI replacement
rates have been reduced in 1985 and 1987. Stricter rules concerning, and more extensive
monitoring of, disability have been introduced in the 1993 law. As a consequence, the DI
stock has, after a continued increase until 1985, now reduced.
Another possible escape route for displaced workers is early retirement. Since the late
1970s there have been arrangements for retirement before the standard retirement age (65
years), which have been formally arranged by law in 1981. There is some circumstantial
evidence that early retirement may be relevant to worker displacement: labor force partic-
ipation rates of Dutch males over 50 years decrease relatively quickly with age compared
to other OECD countries (Thio, 1997). However, the use of early retirement to avoid
layoff costs in case of displacement is clearly restricted by specific age requirements. Also,
early retirement schemes have recently been incorporated in private so called ‘flexible
(elderly) pension plans’, which may reduce the scope for ‘abuse’ of this scheme. Section
7 provides additional information on the role of DI and early retirement.
Finally, although not a direct destination state for displaced workers, it is relevant to
note that the Netherlands provide welfare at the subsistence level for jobless not in UI,
DI, or other schemes (currently around US$500  after taxes per month for singles without
children).
UI premiums are currently not experience rated at the level of individual firms. How-
ever, a small part of cost of UI, roughly 50% of the costs induced by UI benefits paid
during the first 13 weeks of unemployment, is covered by premiums related to sectoral
unemployment risk..
5DI  actually consists of two separate arrangements, one for the first 52 weeks of DI, and one for the
remaining DI spell. In this paper, we will simply label both arrangements by ‘DI’. See CTSV (1997) for
details.
61t  should be noted, however, that Dutch DI also covers disability that is not work-related.
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2.3 Wage formation
Wages in the Netherlands are bounded from below by minimum wages. In 1997, the
minimum wage is set at 2220.40 Dutch guilders (US$ 1110) per month before taxes and
social security premium payments. For workers of ages up to 23 years lower minimum
wages hold.
75% of all employees are covered by collective agreements, which are negotiated by
central bargaining between (large) firms or employer organizations and unions. The re-
sulting agreements, called CAOs,  are usually, but not necessarily, put in terms of lower
bounds on the terms of employment, notably the wage. By law of 1927, central agree-
ments reached by worker unions are applicable to non-union employees as well. By law
of 1937, collective agreements can be declared binding for entire sectors by Minister of
Social Affairs and Employment. Such extensions of the scope of CAOs,  shorthanded AW
from now on, is indeed common practice. One of the data sets used in our analyses dis-
tinguishes between individuals employed under CA0 contracts or AW, and employees
who are not covered by either of these.
3  D a t a
There is no equivalent to the US Displaced Worker Supplement for the Netherlands.
However, we have access to three micro data sets that contain information on various
aspects of displacement:
(i). the Firm Employment (FE) data set,
which provides information on the incidence of displacement, and labor market
transitions immediately following displacement over the period 1992-1996,
(ii). an administrative UI data set,
which allows for the analysis of unemployment spells following displacement for all
workers entering UI in 1992, and
(iii). the Labor Force Survey (LFS) of the OSA,
a labor force panel survey which can in particular be useful for studying earnings
losses following displacement.
3.1 The Firm Employment data
The Firm Employment (FE) data (or Arbeidsvoorwaardenonderzoelc  in Dutch) are firm-
worker data collected by civil servants (of the Labor Inspection) of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment, and provide information on the incidence of displacement over
the period 1992-96. The data are collected yearly (in October 1993-1996) as repeated
cross sections from administrative wage records of a sample of firms by means of a stratified
2 steps sampling procedure.
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Each year (October), in the first step a sample of firms (about 2,000 in each year) is
drawn from the Ministry’s own database (which is roughly similar to the firms database
of Statistics Netherlands, CBS). In the second step, a sample of workers (about 26,000
per year) is drawn from the records of the firms selected in the first step. The workers are
sampled from administrative records of two moments in time, one year before the sampling
date and at the sampling date. A distinction is made between employees who are present
in both years (‘stayers’), workers who are only present in the first year (‘leavers’) and
workers who are only present in the second year (‘entrants’). More than 75% of the
workers are stayers. Information is obtained on the way leavers separate from firms,
which can be used to distinguish between displacement and other separations. Details are
discussed in Subsection 4.2.
As the two step sampling procedure is repeated in October 1993, October 1994, Oc-
tober 1995, and October 1996, we have information on separations and displacement
between October 1992 and October 1993, October 1993 and October 1994, October 1994
and October 1995, and October 1995 and October 1996. For notational convenience, we
will label these four data periods by 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively. It should be
noted that workers that enter and leave a firm between the two sampling moments are
never sampled by this method.
The data set includes additional information on wages, hours worked, days worked and
a number of other variables (e.g. age, tender, sex, education, job complexity, occupation,
SIC industry codes, firm size and type of wage contract). Table 1 provides some sample
characteristics. Appendix A provides detailed information on the variables in the data
set.
As both the first step firm sample and the second step worker sample are stratified,
we have to reweigh the data before performing any (cross-)tabulation. Firm strata are
distinguished by firm size (number of employees) and sector. The number of workers
sampled per firm depends on firm size, whether the worker is a new entrant, a stayer
or has left in the previous period, and whether the employee is covered by a collective
agreement. Weights for the firm strata are computed from the ‘Business Statistics’ of
CBS. For the determination of the weights of the employees, the CBS statistic ‘Jobs of
Employees’ is used.
Finally, it is useful to mention that the data hardly contain any missing cases. Job
complexity levels, for example, are known for more than 99% of the workers.
3.2 The UI data set
The UI data are provided by the Dutch Social Security Council (SVr)  and are adminis-
tratipe  data from the sectoral  organizations that implement the unemployment insurance
system. The data cover all individuals who started collecting UI benefits in 1992. If nec-
essary, individuals are followed up to September 1993. Note that, for a given individual,
the date of inflow into UI as a rule coincides with the date of inflow into unemployment.
For each individual we know the duration of being in UI, except when it is right-censored
8
r  ..;
---
by the end of the observation period (late 1993). If the UI duration is completed then we
know the exit state. As can be learned from the left panel of Table 2, this is usually either
employment (5601)0 or unemployment after completion of UI entitlement (12%). Only 7%
of the spells end because of transition into DI, and hardly any UI spell in our sample ends
in retirement. We do not have information on events occurring after leaving UI.
We observe whether individuals have had a sanction imposed right at the start of
the UI spell. These sanctions are punitive benefit reductions that are applied if the UI
applicant is considered to be (partially) responsible for his job loss. Thus, this variable
can be used to control for worker-initiated separations, as far as these are not excluded
by restricting attention to the UI inflow. Otherwise, the number of explanatory variables
is limited due to the administrative character of the data set. Furthermore, the data do
not contain the exact magnitude of the individual UI benefits level. However, this is a
monotone function of the wage earned before entering unemployment, affected by personal
and household characteristics. The wage as well as these characteristics are observed. The
data only provide very limited information on the individual maximum UI entitlement,
except of course when the individual is observed to complete entitlement.
We create an initial data set by restricting the raw data to cases that can be linked to
a local labor market, i.e. for which sector, municipality, and month of inflow are known.7
This data set contains 219,531 cases, and is used for computing characteristics of local
labor markets. Excluding all cases for which one or more regressor variables are missing
leaves 209,478 cases. This data set is merged with local labor market characteristics com-
puted from the initial data set, and will be the point of departure for the reemployment
duration analysis in Subsection 5.3. Table 2 gives some summary statistics. Appendix B
contains an extensive description of the variables.
3.3 The Labor Force Survey of the OSA
The OSA (Netherlands Organization for Strategic Labor Market Research) Labor Sup-
ply Panel Survey, or just Labor Force Survey (LFS), is a panel which started in 1985.
Presently four waves are available (April-May 1985, August-October 1986, August-
October 1988, and August-November 1990). In the LFS a random sample of households
in the Netherlands is followed over time. Because the study concentrates on individuals
who are between 15 and 61 years of age and who are not full-time students, only house-
holds with at least one person in this category are included. All individuals (and in all
cases the head of the household) in this category are interviewed. The first wave consists
of 4,020 individuals (in 2,132 households). The four waves together contain information
on 8,121 individuals.
In  every interview, retrospective questions are asked about possible labor market tran-
sitions made by the respondent, during the period between the last and current interview.
We therefore do not miss transitions made between to consecutive interview dates (as-
suming recall errors are absent). In case transitions have been made, characteristics of
7See Subsection 5.3. We exclude individuals that are living abroad.
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the transitions are recorded.
These data allow for a reconstruction of the sequence of labor market states occupied
by the respondents and the sojourn times and income levels in these states. This recon-
struction covers at most the five year period 1985 until the end of 1990 for respondents
who participated in all waves, and some retrospective information on the state occupied
at the date of the first interview. 8 We exclude 46 individuals for which the interviews
in which they participated are not successive, which leaves the labor market histories of
8,075 respondents.
The following labor market positions are distinguished: employed (job-tojob  changes
are recorded), self-employed, unemployed, not-in-labor-force, military service, and full-
time education (unemployment and not-in-the-labor-force are distinguished by requiring
unemployed to actively search for a job). For each transition between two of these labor
market states, the respondent is asked to provide a motive or cause (selected from an
extensive list of possible motives and causes), and to indicate whether the transition was
made voluntarily. This information enables us to distinguish displacement from other
separations. We will come back to this issue in Subsection 5.1. Appendix C provides
detailed information on the reported motives and causes.
Most respondents do not experience a labor market transition, namely 78%. Almost
all respondents make less than 4 transitions (99%). The low number of transitions can
be explained by the relatively short observation period (at most 5 years) and the fact
that most respondents are breadwinners, who can be expected to have low job mobility.
At the date of the first interview, 62% of the respondents is employed, whereas 27% is
nonparticipant and 7% is unemployed.
Table 3 provides some characteristics of the sample that is used in this paper. More
details on the LFS data can be found in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Van den
Berg (1992).
4 Incidence of displacement
In this section we investigate the magnitude and composition of the incidence of displace-
ment. Before analyzing the displacement rate in detail using the 1993-1996 FE data set,
we will first assess the time series properties of the rate of displacement over a longer time
period.
4.1 The aggregate displacement rate: 19’70-1993
Sufficiently long time series can be constructed from aggregate UI data, giving the yearly
numbers of new UI cases, and data on the number of employed individuals at risk. The
merits of the first series as a measure of displacement have been discussed in the previous
%ee Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994) for an analysis of attrition using these data. They
find that the effects of attrition on estimates of transition models are unimportant.
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sections. Although it provides only an imperfect measure of displacement, it is the only
measure for which we can construct time series over several business cycles. A more
complete measure of aggregate displacement can be computed from the FE data on a
much shorter time interval. In the next subsection, both this measure and the differences
with the UI measure will be discussed.
Ideally, one would like to measure the second series as the number of unemployed
individuals who would be eligible for UI benefits in case of dismissal. Unfortunately,
we have to approximate this series by the number of employed individuals paying UI
premiums. As this includes individuals with employment histories that are insufficient
for UI eligibility, this provides an upper bound to the number of individuals at risk. As a
consequence, the rate computed is a lower bound on the true rate of displacement leading
to positive unemployment spells.
Figure 1 graphs the annual displacement rate time series constructed in this manner,
together with real GDP growth in The Netherlands (percentage change from previous
year) for the period 1970-1993. The rate of displacement is clearly trending upwards
over the data period, rising from around 4% in 1970 up to 11% in 1993. As to be
expected, we also observe strong fluctuations over the business cycle, with steep increases
in 1970-1972, 1973-1975, 1979-1982, 1986-1987,  and 1990-1993. Comparing this to
the superimposed macro indicator, real GDP growth, we see that displacement rates are
counter-cyclical. Notable exceptions are 1976-1977, 1984-1985, and 1989-1990, which are
all years with decreasing growth and displacement rates. A simple explanation could be
that the downturns of the business cycle lead worker displacement, although this seems
not true for the early 1970s. However, the correlation between both series is -0.58.
A regression of displacement on GDP growth and time shows that displacement changes
-0.33 (s.e. 0.12) percentage points for each percentage point increase in real GDP growth,
and 0.15 (s.e. 0.03) percentage points per year (R2  = 0.69). We do not find significant
coefficients for one and two year lagged GDP growth.
4.2 Displacement rates at the individual level
The FE data can be used to study the variation of displacement over groups of workers.g
For each separation, information is available that is helpful in identifying displacement.
Among other things, the data distinguish layoffs, separations because of expiration of
fixed term contracts, and transitions into other jobs, DI, and early and normal retire-
ment.” It should be understood that this information comes from administrative records
of the separating firm, and is therefore limited by the observational scope of the firm’s
‘This subsection draws on results from a project on crowding out of low skilled workers, in which
three-of the authors are involved at the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in The
Hague.
“Note that we only observe that workers are on a fixed term contract once they separate for that
reason, so that we cannot exclude these workers from the data set. However, this is not a serious problem
as we condition on tenure, which seems more relevant as a determinant of the risk set for displacement.
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Figure 1: The annual rate of displacement
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Note: The displacement rate is defined as the ratio of the number of new UI cases and the number
of employed paying UI premiums. Sources: (enumerator) Kroniek  van de Sociale Verzekeringen,  Table
6.1, College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen, Zoetermeer, 1996; (denominator) Tijdweksen  Arbeid-
srekeningen 1969-l 993: Ramingen van het Opleidingsniveau, een Fusser&and,  Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek (Divisie Sociaal-Economische Statistieken, Sector Integratie en Presentatie), Voorburg, 1996;
(GDP growth) Economic  Outlook, OECD, Paris, 1990 and 1995.
administration. For instance, a worker who is given notice of layoff in the near future
may immediately quit into another job (before the date of layoff) to avoid unemployment.
In this case, the worker is most likely to be recorded as a job-to-job mover, without any
reference to the layoff. However, a worker who stays with the firm until the date of layoff
is most likely to be recorded as a laid off worker. Then, the data do not provide informa-
tion on the labor market state occupied by the worker just after displacement. Similar
arguments can be made for workers moving into DI or early retirement. For instance, for
a worker observed to move into early retirement, we do not have independent information
on the circumstances leading to early retirement. Thus, the causes of separations and
destinations of labor market transitions following separations are intertwined in the data,
and we have to decide upon a proper way to identify displacement.
We have opted for the following method. For all firms, workers under age 60 with
tenure of at least one year who are recorded to be laid off are considered to be displaced.
As argued above, some displaced workers who immediately find a new job, or move into
DI or early retirement, will be excluded by this definition of displacement. To include at
leas;  some of these cases, we will label leavers moving into new jobs, DI or early retirement
from ‘strongly shrinking’ firms to be displaced as well. Since there is no a priori reason
to pick any particular threshold employment loss level separating strongly shrinking firms
from other firms, we have experimented with a number of different criteria. The results
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can be found in Table 4. The first question is whether we should focus on net or gross
employment (outflow) changes. Using the latter, we will overestimate displacement rates
in high turnover sectors, where high simultaneous employment inflow and outflow rates are
no exception, whereas using the former we underestimate displacement at restructuring
firms. If, for example, Philips displaces all workers at its computer division and at the same
time expands its audio and video divisions, we will underestimate the true displacement
rate when we use the net employment criterium. The weakest criterium in Table 4 results
in an aggregate displacement rate of 7.3%,  while the strongest criterium results in an
aggregate displacement rate of 5.1%,  over the 1993-1996 period. In what follows we use
the ‘net employment’ criterium, mainly because other authors in this volume (Denmark,
Belgium) do the same. As we have firm level data, we use a -30% threshold, instead of
the -40% threshold employed by the other authors, who apply it to plant level data.
Finally, note that displacement rates calculated with this data set are lower than
the UI inflow time series figures because we only observe very few firm closings. Also,
the aggregate UI inflow measure does not exclude individuals with sanctions, although
we know from the UI data that around 13% of the inflow into UI in 1992 cannot be
considered displaced according to the sanction indicator (see Section 3 and Subsection
5.3). Furthermore, we do not exclude low tenure individuals from the UI data. In the
analysis of earnings losses with the LFS data we lose one third of the displaced workers if
we restrict the sample to workers with tenure of at least 1 year (see Section 6). Clearly,
the UI eligibility requirements would prevent most of these low tenure workers to end up
in UI, but some overestimation of the incidence of displacement because of this reason
with the UI data seems unavoidable. On the other hand, the analyses on the LFS data in
Subsection 5.1 also suggest that a large proportion of displaced workers in the Netherlands
experiences no unemployment spells at all, which implies that the UI data may well
underestimate the true displacement rate.
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics
First we will give a short description of the variation in displacement rates over time and
between different categories of workers. Table 5 shows that displacement rates do not
differ much between males and females and that displacement rates are much lower for
workers with high tenure. For the US similar results are found for this period. In the
Netherlands, however, the displacement rate decreases faster with tenure. In both coun-
tries, low tenure males have higher displacement rates than low tenure females, whereas
high tenure females have higher displacement rates than high tenure males. Table 6 shows
that the displacement rates for workers at simple jobs, for workers with little formal train-
ing, and for young workers are relatively high. This is in line with standard labor hoarding
and human capital theories. It is also interesting to see that workers covered by a collec-
tive agreement (CAO) have lower displacement rates than workers whose wage contract is
bound (by the minister) to follow CA0 contracts of other firms in the same sector (AW),
and workers with individual contracts only. The fact that displacement rates are highest
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for AW workers could reflect the fact that firms are bound to pay wages that are agreed
upon by other firms to such workers. As such, these wages may not reflect the business
economic conditions of AVV firms. Finally, we see that displacement rates decline by age.
4.2.2 Logit estimates
Although Table 6 is instructive, it does not reveal the partial effects of the different firm
and worker characteristics. We will clarify these effects by estimating two models of the
incidence of displacement. It is important to point out that some of the variables that
are used as explanatory variables may well be endogenous. Employed workers who have
been relatively successful at avoiding displacement in the past may have a high current
tenure as well as a low current probability of displacement. Employed workers who by
accident have been promoted to a job with fringe benefits that exceed what they can get
at other employers may have a high current tenure as well as a high current probability
of displacement. Such endogeneity may bias the parameter estimates below.
In the first model we will assume that the displacement decision is made by the firm.
We will attach an index D, representing the net marginal benefits of displacing the worker,
to each job match. Suppose that the firm will decide to displace the worker if D > 0.
D will typically be influenced by macroeconomic conditions, which we will represent
by calendar time dummies, and by observed and unobserved sectoral  and idiosyncratic
shocks. Thus, D = ,#z+E,  where x contains time dummies and observable firm and worker
characteristics, and E  is a random disturbance representing the unobserved components of
D. Under the proper assumptions, this specification leads to a binary logit  model for the
displacement decision. Table 7 gives the corresponding estimates of p.  The displacement
probability decreases with tenure (up to some level), and with gross hourly wages and
it increases with educational and job complexity level, and it is also relatively high for
workers without collective contracts and workers employed at large firms.
In the second model, we specify displacement as the outcome of a 2 stage decision pro-
cess. First, the firm and the worker observe that the surplus of their match has dissipated,
and agree to separate. Next, a mode of separation is chosen, for instance displacement.
In our second model we therefore estimate a sequential logit  model, which specifies (i) the
probability that a separation occurs and (ii), conditional on this separation, the proba-
bility that the worker is displaced. It should be noted that this second model does not
attribute a specific role to displacement, as opposed to other separation modes, whereas
the binary model, or any other model that does not specify the separation and displace-
ment decisions separately, does. Estimation results of the sequential logit  model can be
found in Tables 8 an 9.
Using these estimates, we compute displacement probabilities for different types of
workers. We evaluate these probabilities at the estimated parameter values and the mean
observed characteristics. Table 10 illustrates the partial effects of the different worker
and firm characteristics. Some differences with the explorative results from Table 6 are
found. Controlling for other characteristics, the displacement probability is no longer
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decreasing with education and job complexity level, and the effect of age is no longer
negative. It appears that in particular low wage workers face a large probability to be
displaced. According to the sequential logit  model, a worker with average characteristics
who earns 15 guilders an hour faces a 7% chance to be displaced, whereas this probability
is only 1% for a worker who earns 50 guilders an hour. This is not a surprising result if
wages are determined by a surplus sharing rule, in which case matches with the highest
surplus have the lowest probability to end. Finally, we see that a collective wage contract
reduces the probability of displacement. Comparing both specifications, we find that the
displacement probabilities predicted by the sequential logit  model are somewhat higher
than those predicted by the (single) binary logit  model.
5 Labor market transitions after displacement
5.1 Labor market states of just-displaced workers
Both the LFS and the FE data provide some information on the labor market states
occupied by workers just after displacement.
In the LFS, three transitions qualify for displacement, i.e. job-to-job transitions (E-
E), transitions from employment to unemployment (E-U), and transitions from em-
ployment to not-in-the-labor-force (E-N). Unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force are
distinguished by the requirement that unemployed are searching for a job. As noted ear-
lier, the LFS provides a self-reported motive or cause for each transition in the data set,
and it provides information on whether or not the transition was made voluntarily. This
information can be used to identify displacement. For instance, if ‘reorganization/plant
closure’ is reported as a cause for leaving a job, the worker is clearly displaced. There
are several other motives which could indicate displacement. For instance, displacement
could also have occurred through DI, in which case disability may be reported as a cause
for leaving employment. In deciding which motivation-voluntariness combinations iden-
tify displacement, we have to realize that the reported motivations and voluntariness are
heavily liable to subjective perceptions (like the distinction between a quit and a lay-
off). Having this in mind, we have decided to consider transitions with the following
motivation-voluntariness pairs as displacement.
The motivation ‘I would have lost my job anyway’ will most likely be applicable to
situations in which people anticipate displacement. In this case we take both voluntary
as involuntary transitions, because there seems to be no reason to believe that one or the
other excludes displacement. The same holds for the cause ‘reorganization/plant closure’.
With respect to the motivation ‘early retirement’ involuntary transitions seem most likely
to denote displacement. Voluntary early retirements will probably cover individuals who
prefer to stop working irrespective of economic conditions in the firm, and these individuals
would have reported ‘lost job anyway’ in case of displacement. Finally, we have the
transitions into DI. For this motivation we distinguish between E-E and E-U transitions
on the one hand and E-N on the other. We think that in case of a E-E or E-U
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transition, both voluntary and involuntary transitions denote displacement, because these
people keep working or are searching for a job after the transition, so they are not really
incapacitated for work. i1  In case an E-N transition is made, we assume that displacement
is indicated by voluntary transitions, while involuntary transitions will cover transitions
for pure medical reasons.
Table 11 shows the number of displaced workers by transition and motivation in our
sample. In total we observe 327 displacements. The large majority involves job to job
transitions (70%). As for motivations, in most cases (68%) displacement is indicated by
the most clear-cut motivation, ‘reorganization/plant closure’. Only a small share is due
to DI (17%) or early retirements (1%). If we restrict attention to workers with tenure
of at least 1 year, only 162 displacements are left. However, qualitatively similar results
hold for this subsample.
As we stated before, the FE data also give some information on the labor market state
just after displacement. From the discussion of this data set it should be clear that this
labor market state is not observed for those displaced workers who are labeled as being
laid off. However, firms are likely to be involved in arranging DI and, in particular, early
retirement for workers if these destinations are really used as convenient ways to displace
workers, in which case we may expect that these transitions are actually recorded. Simi-
larly, because of employment protection regulation, we may expect that firms are involved
in reemploying displaced workers, and that at least some job-to-job transitions of dis-
placed workers are recorded. In any case, the share of layoffs in overall displacement only
provides an upper bound to the share of displaced wor.kers  ending up in unemployment
right after being displaced.
Table 13 compares the layoff rates, job-to-job transition rates, DI inflow rates, and
early retirement rates between 30% shrinking firms and other firms. We see that not
only the layoff rates are higher at the 30% shrinking firms but also the other separation
probabilities. This seems to indicate that at least some displaced workers enter DI or early
retirement, or move into another job directly. However, the second row for each type of
firms shows that a relatively high share of separations from shrinking firms are labeled as
layoffs, and relatively few as job-to-job transitions. So, most of the displacement seems
to be captured by layoffs.
5.2 Labor market states 1 year after displacement
It is interesting to see what labor market states displaced workers occupy 12 months after
displacement. Table 12 gives the number of individuals in the different labor market
states, by type of transition made just after displacement.12  The table shows that most
*lAlthough  this may be due to DI legislation. Partly disabled workers have to find a job for their
remaining work capacity. We cannot distinguish these cases. However, this rule came into effect in 1987,
so it only affects observations in part of our observation period (See Hassink,  Van Ours, Ridder, 1997).
12The total number of observations is smaller than in Table 11, because in some cases information on
sojourn times was missing.
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individuals are still in the same state as when they became displaced. We cannot derive
strong results on E-U and E-N transitions, because of the limited amount of individuals
in this category, but for job to job movers it seems that they do not have problems finding
steady employment after being displaced.
5.3 Re-employment durations
We analyze re-employment durations following displacement using the 1992 UI inflow
data set. We distinguish individuals who have been sanctioned for responsibility for job
loss, and individuals who have not been sanctioned. Only the latter are considered to
be displaced. The sanctioned individuals may then serve as a ‘control’ group, where
we should acknowledge that this group only contains individuals who are eligible for UI
benefits, and no individuals who have for instance quit their jobs, or that have been
dismissed for severe misconduct. Also, the groups may differ for two reasons other than
cause of separation. First, the ‘non-displaced’ individuals have been sanctioned, which
implies that they will face reduced benefits for at least some period of time. Second,
workers are likely to be non-randomly selected into both states, for which we will not
directly control.
Table 14 presents summary statistics of re-employment durations by demographic
group. As 44% of the durations are right-censored, we compute median durations, in
particular median residual durations at 0 and 26 weeks. From the upper panel we learn
that the median re-employment duration of all spells is 20.8 weeks. For displaced workers,
the median duration is 3.5 weeks shorter than for sanctioned workers. The median residual
durations at 26 weeks are 4-5 times larger, implying strong negative duration dependence
of the corresponding re-employment hazard rates. It is well known that this can both be
explained by ‘genuine’ duration dependence at the individual level, e.g. because of stigma
effects or atrophy of skills, and dynamic sorting because of exit rate heterogeneity (see
for instance Lancaster, 1979). The fact that median residual durations are now longer for
displaced workers can possibly be traced back to heterogeneity in terms of unobserved and
other observed characteristics. Earlier analyses of the same data by Abbring, Van den Berg
and Van Ours (1997) indeed show that both negative genuine duration dependence and
observed and unobserved heterogeneity play a significant role in explaining the observed
duration dependency pattern. The lower panel restricts attention to displaced workers,
and gives median durations for various demographic groups.
Apart from the sanction variable, we develop another indicator of displacement, or,
more precisely, a proxy for excess firings in the local labor market of each individual.
From the UI inflow census we can compute the size of the inflow in UI in each month of
1992’in  each Dutch municipality by sector. Thus, we can distinguish local labor markets
by municipality and sector, and define excess UI inflow in a local labor market to be the
inflow into UI in that market net of the overall average inflow over time, municipality
and sector. More formally, if hst is the inflow in UI in municipality m in sector s
in month t, then data on kst for all municipalities, sectors, and months in 1992 are
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regressed on municipality, sector and time dummies, yielding both predicted counts &St
and residual counts tmst = hSt  - Lst for each cell or (m, s, t). Now, each combination
(m, s) represents a local labor market, and the imst is an indicator of excess firings in
local labor market (m, s) in month t. We can assign each individual to a local labor
market, and use 2 as a regressor in an analysis of re-employment durations. As we
will, for computational reasons, only include province indicators, instead of municipality
indicators, in the duration analysis, it is useful to also include 2 as a regressor.
The duration model for re-employment durations is specified as a single risk mixed
proportional hazard (MPH) model, with the log hazard for reemployment given by
logB(tlz,  V)  = f: x,1,(t)  + X’P  + 21, (1)
i=o
where Xi,  i = 0, . . . , 6, are duration dependency parameters representing levels of a piece-
wise constant baseline hazard, and ,0  is the regressor parameter vector. x is a regressor
vector containing both the sanction indicator, the cell or local labor market indicators,
and other individual characteristics. Ii(t) is an indicator function which equals 1 if t E  Ii
and 0 otherwise, where we take (with t in weeks) IO = [0, S),  11 = [8,16),  12 = [16,24),
I3  = [24,32),  I4  = [32,45),  I5  = [45,58) and Is  = [58,oo).  We normalize X0  = 0. v is
an unobserved component which is assumed to be discretely distributed, so that, with n
points of support, Pr(v  = vi)  = pi,  for i = 1, . . . , n, and pn = 1 - cylrr pi.  Because of
their flexibility and computational convenience, discrete distributions for unobservables
are frequently used in MPH analyses. I3 We will fix the number of mass points at n = 2,
and perform sensitivity analysis by r-e-estimating the model for higher values of n. Finally,
we treat destinations different from re-employment as randomly right-censoring the re-
employment durations. Also, we have right-censoring because of the fact that individuals
are only followed until late 1993.
Table 15 shows results from maximum likelihood estimation. The most important
finding is that individuals who are displaced according to the sanction indicator, i.e.
who do not have sanctions imposed, have approximately 20% higher re-employment rates
than sanctioned individuals. Considering the fact that sanctions, if they have any direct
effect, are likely to increase x-e-employment rates, this figure provides a lower bound on
the difference between displaced and non-displaced workers, given a similar benefits level.
The excess firings indicator, the ‘residual size of the cell’, has a significantly positive
effect on re-employment rates, which could be explained as a signalling effect. Workers
that are involved in excess, or even mass, firings, are more attractive than workers that
are singled out for layoff. This result is consistent with the findings of Gibbons and Katz
(199.1) for the US, who find that workers displaced because of plant closing have shorter
13The  flexibility of discrete distributions as heterogeneity, or mixture, distributions is illustrated by
a result of Heckman  and Singer (1984), who show that in MPH models the non-parametric maximum
likelihood estimator of the heterogeneity distribution is a discrete distribution. However, the estimation
procedure requires the number of points of support not to be fixed in advance, and estimation of standard
errors is not straightforward.
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re-employment durations than workers laid off because of slack work or elimination of
a position or shift. It is also interesting to note that the predicted size of the local
labor market has a significantly negative effect on re-employment rates, which could be a
symptom of congestion effects on local labor markets. It should be noted that this variable
is identified on variation between municipalities only, as the model contains full sets of
time and sector dummies. Wage has a significantly positive effect on re-employment rates,
and age a significantly negative effect (from age 16 onwards). Wald test statistics for the
joint significance of the three sets of dummies show that there is significant variation (at
a 5% level) across sectors, months of inflow and provinces. Most of the variation in re-
employment rates between cells or local labor markets is caused by sectoral  heterogeneity.
We also find significant unobserved heterogeneity and negative individual duration
dependence of re-employment rates. The table includes an Information Matrix (IM) test
on the unobserved heterogeneity parameters (see White, 1982). Chesher (1984) has shown
that this t,est  on the equality of the score and Hessian representations of the IM can be
interpreted as a test on local parameter variation. In this case, the IM test can be expected
to detect additional unobserved heterogeneity, and can be shown to be x2  distributed with
2 degrees of freedom. Thus, the IM equality is just rejected at a 5% significance level.
However, adding an additional mass point to the heterogeneity distribution does not
change the results: two mass points converge to the same value and other parameter
estimates are unaffected.
We illustrate the results by the survivor function for the mean individual, which is
given by
evaluated at the means of the observed and unobserved covariates. Figure 2 graphs the
estimated survivor function. Also, Table 16 gives re-employment probabilities computed
with the estimated model, by fixing the unobserved heterogeneity component at its esti-
mated mean and the regressors at the sample mean, and considering one-by-one deviations
of regressors from this mean. Of the displaced workers 55% (73%) is re-employed within
26 weeks (52 weeks). For sanctioned individuals these probabilities are slightly lower. We
still find strong negative effects of age on re-employment probabilities. Wages have pos-
itive effects on re-employment probabilities, ceteris  paribus,  which overturns the results
from the raw median estimates.
6 Earnings changes
To analyze possible earnings losses between pre- and post-displacement jobs, three tran-
sitions are relevant: E-N-E, E-U-E and E-E transitions. In our sample, we have
1,719 observations on these transitions, including both displacement and other types of
separation from the first employment spell. Only one income level is reported for each
individual labor market spell. However, under the assumption that earnings do not vary
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Figure 2: Estimated survivor function (until re-employment) for the mean UI recipient
d u r a t i o n  ( w e e k s )  +
within employment spells, the change in earnings between pre- and post-separation jobs
equals the change of earnings between the date of separation and the date of entering
the first new job. To correct these earnings differentials for inflation, we have used the
monthly all-item Consumer Price Index. l4 After this inflation correction, there are 1,551
observations left.15  If we restrict our sample to workers with tenure of at least one year
in the first employment spell, we have 668 observations.‘”
The average post- and pre-separation earnings ratio in this sample is 1.24, with a
standard error equal to 0.02. For the subsample of displaced individuals (232 observations)
this average equals 1.18, with a standard error equal to 0.04. For our subsample of
workers with sufficient tenure we find an average earnings ratio of 1.24 (0.02) for all
workers, and of 1.14 (0.03) for displaced workers (116 observations). In either case, real
earnings rise significantly between two consecutive employment spells. Because there is no
significant difference between the ratio for all workers and for displaced workers (their 95%
confidence intervals are overlapping), this indicates that displacement has no significant
effect on future earnings. To investigate this further, we have have regressed the log real
r4Source:  CBS, Maandschrift,  September 1988 and January 1991.
15There  are several reasons for this loss of observations. First, the starting date of the first observed
labor market state can be missing. In this case the different states cannot be linked to calendar time,
which- is needed for the inflation correction. Second, the starting date may be inconsistent with the
reported sojourn time, given the date of the first interview. Finally, one or more sojourn times may be
missing.
r6Note  that most observations are lost because tenure is missing: tenure is observed for 1,069 of the
1,551 observations. Of these 1,069 cases, 168 cases concern displacement. Of the 668 observations with
sufficient tenure, 116 concern displacement, which is 69% of 168. This number is referred to in the
discussion of the UI inflow measure in Subsection 4.2.
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earnings ratio on tenure in the first employment spell, the duration of the intervening non-
employment spell, defined to be 0 for E-E cases, a dummy variable indicating whether the
separation concerns displacement, and some additional controls. The estimation results
are reported in Table 17.
The estimation results confirm the preliminary conclusions from the comparison of the
averages. Displacement does not have a significant effect on earnings after a separation.
Moreover, the first column shows that the effect of displacement is very small if we do
not include the tenure criterion in the displacement definition. In column 2 we find some
evidence of a negative effect of displacement if we restrict the displacement indicator to
separations of workers with at least 1 year of tenure. This is confirmed by estimates for
the tenure-restricted sample in the third column. Also, in all cases we find a significantly
negative effect of the length of the spell of intervening joblessness. Thus, workers who
have been without work longer experience smaller earnings gains. This could be seen
as negative duration dependence and can be explained by stigma effects or loss of skills.
Log tenure is generally insignificant, but the results in the second column indicate that
workers with tenure below 1 year face significantly smaller earnings gains.
7 Retirement and disability
The results from Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that early retirement and DI have been
used to facilitate displacement. The LFS data (Tables 11 and 12) show that at least some
displaced workers have persistently retired from the labor force, either by early retirement
or in DI, in the 1985-1990 period. The tables also indicate that this concerns at most
10% of all displaced workers. More surprisingly, the FE data (Table 13) attribute some
role to both early retirement and DI in the 1993-1996 period, even though DI legislation
has undergone major changes to avoid improper use (see Section 2).
The improper use of DI and the role of early retirement have received ample attention
in the Dutch policy debate, and numerous empirical studies on these issues exist. Although
these usually do not focus on displaced workers per se, some of these papers offer insights
that are useful in the context of displacement.
A series of papers has sought to explain the relatively high DI caseload in the Nether-
lands (see Hassink,  Van Ours, and Ridder, 1997, for an overview). It is found that up
to 50% of the DI inflow before the reforms in the late 1980s is related to ‘redundancy
of workers’, and not to actual health problems. This may appear as a rather extreme
conclusion, but it is consistent with the relatively high DI rates in the Netherlands (see
Section 2). Hassink  et al., using a panel survey of firms by the OSA, estimate that still
10% of the DI inflow in the late 1980s (after the 1980s reforms) is related to redundancy.
Although they do not investigate DI in the course of the 1990s  it can be expected that
the 1993 reforms have reduced this number much further.
Thio (1997) uses a 1993 survey among elderly head of households and their partners,
conducted by the Centre for Economic Research on Retirement and Ageing (CERRA).
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Thio uses a subsample of heads of household of 53-63 years old who were not working
(‘retired’) at the time of the interview, have at least been working up to age 40, and
who have been working for at least 3 months with their last employer. The data distin-
guish various self-reported reasons for retiring from their last job. One group of reasons
corresponds to layoffs for economic reasons, or displacement. Other categories distin-
guished are quits, health-related separations, separations related to working conditions,
and separations because of family reasons. The data also distinguish various exit routes
for retirement, among which are early retirement and DI. In the sample of retired heads
of household used, 37% are on DI and 43% in early retirement. The average retirement
age is 54 years.
In 96% of the DI cases, health is reported as a reason for retirement, and in 86% as the
primary reason. In 24% of the DI cases, layoff is reported as a reason, but in only 8% as
the primary reason. This seems consistent with the results found by Hassink  et al., as the
average time between retirement and the survey is 5 years, implying that the results are
roughly applicable to the late 1980s. Furthermore, as the data apply to the period before
the major DI reform of 1993, the results are again likely to overestimate the current role
of DI in facilitating displacement. Of individuals in early retirement, 37% report layoff as
a reason for retirement, and 26% report layoff as the primary reason. Thus, it seems that
a significant share of the inflow into early retirement is related to displacement. Finally,
it is shown that 60% of retirement because of layoffs, including retired in UI and other
schemes, is concentrated among 54-59 years old, and only 9% concerns individuals of age
60 and up.i7
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the incidence and consequences of displacement in the
Netherlands. In the next stage of this project this paper will be merged with similar
analyses for the US. The scope for direct comparisons between the US and the Nether-
lands will be somewhat hampered by differences in the available data sets: there is no
equivalent to the most obvious US data source, the Displaced Worker Supplement, in the
Netherlands. One specific and final comment concerns the comparison of wage discounts
between the two countries.
This comparison is hampered by the different character of transitions following dis-
placement between countries. In the Netherlands, non-employment durations are usually
much larger, and we have found some evidence that many more displaced workers move
into alternative employment direct1y.i’
17Bg construction of the data set, the remainder is in the 40-53 age group.
18Layard,  Nickel1 and Jackman  (1991) provide a steady state estimate of unemployment durations of
around 3 months for 1988 for both countries (see Layard et al., 1991: Table 1 of Chapter 5. Furthermore,
Table 2 shows that this is fairly typical of the period 1962-1989). In the Netherlands, however, mean
unemployment durations are usually larger than one year: Layard et al. even give a steady state estimate
of 25 months for 1988. Also, median m-employment durations in our 1992 UI data set are 6 weeks longer
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With long post-displacement non-employment spells, issues like loss of skills are likely
to be more relevant. This implies that wage discounts per se are not easy to interpret,
and hard to measure properly. These problems have recently been encountered by Cohen,
Lefranc and Saint-Paul (1997)) who compare the US and French  labor markets. Using
the Enque^te  Emploi,  collected by the INSEE,  for Prance and the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics for the US, they find that wage discounts after displacement are roughly similar
in both countries. However, the discussion following the paper shows that it is not easy
to draw any clear conclusions from this.
Long non-employment durations in the Netherlands seem less of a problem as displaced
workers apparently experience less non-employment spells than their US counterparts.
However, this may be related to the fact that Dutch workers face stronger employment
protection, and may be able to bargain over alternative employment in case of displace-
ment. As such, the immediately re-employed may have quite different characteristics than
the same group of displaced workers in the US. Also, the threat of long unemployment
spells may stimulate workers anticipating displacement to search actively for another job
while still employed.
.
than median reemployment durations in the US data set.a This is remarkable, as our data set excludes
workers entering other schemes and hardly ever returning to employment, and includes at least some
short tenure workers, who can be expected to be more mobile. The finding that residual m-employment
durations increase dramatically with duration is consistent with this.
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Appendices
A The FE Data
The Firm Employment (FE) data were collected by the Dutch ‘Labor inspection’, which
is part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, and contains administrative
data on workers employed in both the private and the public sector. For our analyses
we only use private sector workers below 60 years of age with at least 1 year of tenure
(unless stated otherwise). Below we give information on the construction of some of the
key variables.
displacement:
All workers with at least 1 year of tenure who are laid off, and, additionally, all
separations because of disability (DI), early retirement and transitions into other
jobs directly at firms that face a (net) loss of more than 30% of their work force.
other outflow: Workers who separate from a (non-30%-shrinking) firm because of
(early) retirement, disability (DI), end of test-period, transition into an other job,
or expiration of a contract with a temporary work office.
job complexity level:
We use the following classification of job complexity levels:
- low: Simple, generally repeating, activities that take place under direct super-
vision. Little or no formal schooling or experience is required.
- intermediate: Less simple activities that partly take place without direct su-
pervision. Administrative or technical knowledge is often required.
- high: Activities that require a higher level of knowledge and experience, and
that take place without direct supervision. Also, management activities that
require an academic or comparable level.
tenure:
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling dates).
wage:
Monthly wages (including extra time payments, profit shares, etc.) and hours
worked are measured very accurately. We calculate gross hourly wages for each
worker and deflate the wage by the all-item Consumer Price Index.
.
wage agreement:
We distinguish 3 types of wage contracts. Most workers have a collective agreement
(CAO) which is negotiated at the sectoral  level, or by leading firms within a sector.
The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has the right to force all other firms
within a sector to follow an existing CAO, which is labeled by AW. The remaining
2 6
workers have bilateral employment contracts only. These workers are in general
employed at higher positions.
0 part-time/full-time:
Part-time refers to working less than 100% of the regular number of hours.
l education:
Education refers to years of completed education. When it takes 4 years to complete
higher vocational education, the reported years of schooling will be 4 years (plus
the number of years it takes to finish high school and elementary school) even if the
worker has spent more or less years to complete his actual higher vocational degree.
B The UI data
The UI data set is provided by Dutch Social Security Council (SVr)  and contains adminis-
trative data from the sectoral  organizations that implement the unemployment insurance
system. All cases of individuals applying for unemployment benefits in 1992 were included
in the database, and, if necessary, followed up to September 1993. We excluded all cases
that started collecting benefits before 1992, or for which one or more exogenous variables
are missing. Below we give some details on measurement and construction of some of the
variables.
l duration unemployment insurance benefits:
Both the duration of the insurance benefits period and the destination state of
individuals whose benefits expire are observed. Durations are observed in intervals.
13 biweekly intervals cover the first half year. Then we have one 6-week interval,
for durations between 26 and 32 weeks. On the interval 32 to 318 weeks we are able
to distinguish 22 quarterly duration classes. The remaining durations are observed
as being 318 weeks or longer. As we are not considering benefit payments that
started before 1992, and we are only following benefits recipients up to September
1993, there is no right-censoring because of observations in the residual class 318
weeks and higher. We observe, however, unemployment spells that are still lasting
at the end of September 1993, and destinations of transitions out of unemployment
insurance different from employment. In our analysis, both are considered to be
right-censored.
0 sanctions:
-The  data set contains a variable indicating whether a sanction has been imposed at
the start of the UI spell (because of responsibility for becoming unemployed). We
do not use information on sanctions that are imposed during the UI spell, as these
are related to behavior during the unemployment spell and not to any behavior that
may have lead to displacement.
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0 age:
Age is computed as the age in years at the start of the individual’s benefits spell.
0 wage:
Wage is the daily wage before taxes earned by the individual before becoming un-
employed. It is the wage that is used by the administrative organization to compute
the level of the benefits. It is observed in 43 intervals of width 10 guilders up to 430
guilders, and a residual interval for those earning over 430 guilders. The continuous
wage variable is defined as the average wage in each wage class, or 435 guilders for
those in the highest wage class. An additional dummy is included for the highest
wage class.
l provinces and urbanization:
Municipality codes are observed and recoded to provincial and urbanization dum-
mies. The provinces are Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland,
Gelderland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, and
Zeeland. Urbanized areas are municipalities that are highly urbanized according to
Statistics Netherlands (CBS): Amsterdam, Delft, The Hague, Groningen, Haarlem,
Leiden, Rijswijk, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Utrecht, Vlaardingen, and Voorburg.
0 part-time/full-time:
Like the wage information this variable refers to the employment situation of the
benefits recipient preceding the unemployment spell. Full-time refers to working
100% or more of the regular number of hours. Part-time refers to working less than
100% of the regular number of hours.
C Reported motives and causes in the LFS data
The OSA (Netherlands Organization for Strategic Labor Market Research) Labor Force
Survey follows a random sample of households in The Netherlands over time. On the basis
of these data, sequences of labor market states occupied by the respondents are recon-
structed. The following labor market states are distinguished: employed, self-employed,
unemployed, not-in-labor-force, military service and full-time education. For each transi-
tion between two of these labor market states, the respondent is asked to provide a motive
or cause selected from an extensive list of possible motives and causes:
(i) . Due to ‘Tweeverdienerswet’ (Law on double-income households)
(ii). I wanted a more interesting job
(iii).. I wanted a more secure job
(iv). I wanted a job with better career opportunities
(v). I wanted a better paying job
(vi). I would have lost my job anyway
(vii). Unemployment benefits are sufficient
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(viii). I wanted a job
(ix). Reorganization/plant closure
(x). Bankruptcy
(xi). Family business closed/reorganized
(xii). Laid off for other reasons
(xiii). Early retirement
(xiv). Retired, gone living off my investments
(xv). Disability
(xvi). Marriage
(xvii). Birth of a child
(xviii). Move of household or partner
(xix). My family situation did not allow it anymore
(xx). I wanted my old job back
(xxi). I wanted to earn my own wage or an extra wage again
(xxii). My family situation allowed it again
(xxiii). I wanted to be more among people
(xxiv). I wanted to attend classes again
(xxv). I just finished my education
(xxvi). I had to fulfill military service
(xxvii). I just fulfilled military service
.
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D Tables
Table 1: FE data: Weighted means (1993-1996)
variable mean
year 1993 23%
1994 25%
1995 24%
1996 28%
gender female 36%
male 64%
~011.  agreement CA0 72%
AVV 5%
none 23%
job complexity level low 18%
intermediate 71%
high 11%
education (years) 11.3
age (years) 36.6
tenure (years) 8.5
real gross hourly wage (guilders) 32.2
total # workers 101,327
Note: Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workers with tenure below 1 year have been
excluded. ‘year’ refers to sampling year. Note that data on two consecutive years for each worker are
collected at a single sampling date, October of the sample year, by reviewing the administrative records
of both the sampling date and one year before the sampling date. ‘CAO’ refers to coverage by a collective
agreement, ‘AVV’ to coverage by a mandatory extension of such an agreement.
.
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Table 2: UI data: Some characteristics
mean st. dev.
# spells 209,478 non-displaced (sanction) 13%
terminated by age (years) 32.0 10.9
re-employment 56% daily wage (guilders) 122.5 65.9
maximum entitlement 12% female 43%
transition into DI 7% urban 17%
end of observation period 17% part-time 29%
other 8 % married 40% I
Note: Wages are observed in lo-guilder intervals and are right-censored at 430 guilders. Sample mean
and standard error of wages are computed by recoding wages to mean interval wages, or to 435 guilders
if right-censored. ‘Other’ includes (among other things) reaching the age of 65 years, death, military
service and self-employment, all of which occur in less than 0.5% of the cases.
Table 3: LFS earnings sample: Sample characteristics
all workers tenure 2 1 yr.
variable mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
ratio post- and pm-separation earnings 1.22 0.62 1.24 0.55
tenure (months) 44.4 71.0 67.5 81.5
age (years) 30.0 8.1 31.0 8.3
spell (months) 0.7 3.5 0.6 3.3
i.d.,  nonzero  spells only 8.8 9.5 10.4 10.1
education primary/lower sec. 36% 34%
intermediate 41% 43%
higher 18% 19%
university 5% 5 %
4ispl 16%
d’!
dzspl 11% 17%
female 40% 36%
married/cohabitating 69% 75%
non-Dutch 3% 3%
total # individuals 1069 668
# nonzero  intervening spells 81 37
Note: ‘Ratio post- and pre-separation earnings’ refers to real after-tax monthly earnings in the pre-
separation and the first post-separation jobs. ‘Tenure’ is tenure on the preseparation job in months, and.
is also used to select the cases in the right panel. ‘Age’ denotes the age at the date of the first interview
in years. ‘Spell’ is the duration of the non-employment spell between the pre- and post-separation
jobs in months (0 for E-E cases). dfiispl is a dummy indicating whether the separation was caused by
displacement (1) or not (0), using the definition discussed in the main text. diiSp,  equals diispl  with the
additional requirement that the tenure of the displaced individual equals at least 1 year.
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Table 4: Reported labor market states of workers at extremely shrinking firms: 1993-1996
(in % of employment at all firms)
criterium % firms layoff new job early retir. DI displacement
employment -20 % 9.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 5.6
(net change) -30 % 5.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.2
-40 % 2.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.1
outflow -20 % 36.5 2.0 1.2 0.2 0.1 7.3
(gross change) -30 % 21.6 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 6.4
-40 % 13.4 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.0 5.9
Note: Based on weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workers with tenure
below 1 year have been excluded. ‘Displacement’ indicates total displacement (‘layoffs’, excluding ‘layoffs
during test periods’, at all firms, and, on top of that, transitions into ‘new jobs’, ‘early retirement’ and
‘DI’ at shrinking firms) as a percentage of total employment. Firm shares are computed among firms
with workers in the selected category.
Table 5: Annual displacement rates by tenure during 1993-1995 period (in %)
tenure (years) all workers males females
all 4 .1 4.2 4.0
<l 10.1 11.0 8.9
l-2 6.7 7.6 5.6
3-4 4.3 4.8 3.6
5-9 2.7 2.8 2.5
> 10 1.6 1.6 1.7
Note: Based on weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Displacement is identified
with ‘layoffs’ (excluding ‘layoffs during test periods’) at any firm, and, on top of that, transitions into
‘new jobs’, ‘early retirement’ and ‘DI’ at firms with net employment changes < -30%.
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Table 6: Displacement and other separation frequencies 1993-1996 (in %)
year
variable no transition displaced other outflow
all 89.0 5.2 5.8
1993 87.2 7.5 5.3
1994 90.7 2.6 6.7
1995 89.1 2.4 8.5
1996 88.9 8.0 3.1
gender female 87.8 5.3 6.9
male 89.7 5.2 5.2
tenure (years) <l 88.8 5.7 5.5
l-2 82.9 8.0 9.0
3-4 87.9 5.9 6.2
5-10 91.7 4.1 4.2
> 10 94.1 2.1 3.8
~011. agreement CA0 89.4 4.8 5.9
AVV 86.7 6.8 6.4
none 88.0 6.3 5.7
job complexity level low 84.1 6.7 9.3
intermediate 90.0 4.9 5.1
high 91.5 4.3 4.2
education (years) 5 10 88.1 5.4 6.5
10 < . < 15 90.3 4.8 4.9
2 15 90.1 5.3 4.6
age (ye=) 18-19 74.9 10.9 14.2
20-29 84.0 8.0 8.1
30-39 90.2 5.0 4.8
40-49 93.4 3.3 3.3
250 90.8 2.4 6.9
c
Note: Baaed on weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workers with tenure
below 1 year have been excluded (except in the row giving results for these workers). Displacement is
identified with ‘layoffs’ (excluding ‘layoffs during test periods’) at any firm, and, on top of that, transitions
into ‘new jobs’, ‘early retirement’ and ‘DI’ at firms with net employment changes < -30%. ‘CAO’ refers
to coverage by a collective agreement, ‘AVV’  to coverage by a mandatory extension of such an agreement.
.
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Table 7: Binary logit  estimate of probability of displacement
intercept
log age
(log  we)2
female
log tenure
(log tenure)2
log wage
(log wage)2
part-time
education (years)
job complexity
low
intermediate
occupation
simple technical 0.11 (0.12)
administrative 0.26 (0.12)
management 0.04 (0.13)
services 0.14 (0.12)
commercial 0.30 (0.12)
creative -0.05 (0.17)
estimate (s.e.)
-22.46 (2.37)
16.59 (1.48)
-2.36 (0.21)
-0.21 (0.04)
-0.34 (0.05)
-0.043 (0.02)
-3.79 (0.26)
0.39 (0.04)
-0.65 (0.05)
-0.56 (0.08)
-0.44 (0.08)
-0.43 (0.08)
1 estimate (s.e.)
wage agreement
CA0
AVV
sector
manufacturing
construction
trade
restaurants etc.
transport, comm.
financial
health
firm size
lo-19
20-49
5ck99
100-199
200-499
2 500
year = 1993
year = 1994
year = 1995
log c
N
. ,
-0.09 (0.03)
-0.03 (0.07)
-0.05 (0.10)
0.16 (0.10)
-0.23 (0.10)
0.43 (0.12)
-0.11 (0.11)
0.07 (0.10)
-0.05 (0.10)
-0.13 (0.05)
-0.21 (0.05)
-0.37 (0.06)
-0.27 (0.05)
-0.02 (0.05)
0.42 (0.05)
-0.26 (0.04)
-1.39 (0.05)
-1.01 (0.05)
-20,509.90
100,094
I
1
Note: Logit  estimate with dependent states ‘displaced’ and ‘not displaced’ (reference state). Based on
weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years or with tenure below 1 year are excluded. Displacement
is identified with ‘layoffs’ (excluding ‘layoffs during test periods’) at any firm, and, on top of that,
transitions into ‘new jobs’, ‘early retirement’ and ‘DI’ at firms with net employment changes < -30%.
Wages are real gross hourly wages (in Dutch guilders) including extra time payments, profit shares,
etcetera. Age and tenure are measured in years. ‘CAO’ refers to coverage by a collective agreement,
‘AVV’ to coverage by a mandatory extension of such an agreement. Firm size is measured by the number
of employees. Reference states are ‘male’, ‘full-time’, ‘high job complexity’, ‘IT’, ‘no collective wage
agreement ‘, ‘agriculture/mining’, ‘firm with < 10 workers’, and ‘year = 1996’.
.
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Table 8: Logit  estimate of probability of separation (first stage of sequential logit)
intercept
log age
(log  agej2
female
log tenure
(log tenure)2
log wage
(log wage) 2
part-time
education (years)
job complexity
low
intermediate
occupation
simple technical
administrative
management
services
commercial
creative
estimate (s.e.)
-5.27 (1.54)
0.17 (0.96)
0.01 (0.14)
-0.06 (0.03)
-0.52 (0.03)
0.04 (0.01)
-3.33 (0.18)
0.34 (0.02)
-0.39 (0.03)
-0.01 (0.01)
-0.33 (0.06)
-0.28 (0.05)
-0.08 (0.09)
0.03 (0.09)
-0.07 (0.10)
-0.02 (0.09)
0.16 (0.09)
0.06 (0.12)
wage agreement
CA0
AVV
sector
manufacturing
construction
trade
restaurants etc.
transport, comm.
financial
health
firm size
lo-19
2649
50-99
100-199
200-499
2 500
year= 1993
year= 1994
vear=  1995
estimate (s.e.)
-0.04 (0.03)
-0.04 (0.05)
-0.03 (0.07)
0.18 (0.07)
-0.20 (0.07)
0.43 (0.09)
-0.03 (0.08)
0.07 (0.07)
-0.03 (0.08)
-0.02 (0.04)
-0.06 (0.04)
-0.11 (0.04)
-0.05 (0.05)
0.13 (0.04)
0.52 (0.04)
0.003 (0.03)
-0.42 (0.03)
0.23 (0.03)
-34,848.27
100,094
Note: Logit  estimate with dependent states ‘leave’ and ‘stay’ (reference state). Based on weighted FE
data. Workers older than 60 years or with tenure below 1 year are excluded. Wages are real gross hourly
wages (in Dutch guilders) including extra time payments, profit shares, etcetera. Age and tenure are
measured in years. ‘CAO’ refers to coverage by a collective agreement, ‘AW’ to coverage by a mandatory
extension of such an agreement. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Reference states are
‘male’, ‘full-time’, ‘high job complexity’, ‘IT’, ‘no collective wage agreement’, ‘agriculture/mining’, ‘firm
with < 10 workers’, and ‘year = 1996’.
.
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Table 9: Logit  estimate of probability of displacement conditional on separation (second
stage of sequential logit)
estimate (s.e.) estimate (s.e.)
intercept -29.77 (2.94) wage agreement
log age 18.16 (1.83) CA0 -0.12 (0.05)
(log  agel -2.65 (0.26) AVV 0.10 (0.10)
female -0.45 (0.05) sector
log tenure 0.09 (0.06) manufacturing 0.07 (0.14)
(log tenure)2 -0.07 (0.02) construction 0.12 (0.14)
log wage 0.26 (0.35) trade 0.03 (0.14)
(log wage)2 -0.07 (0.05) restaurants etc. 0.20 (0.17)
part-time -0.20 (0.06) transport, comm. 0.13 (0.16)
education (years) 0.04 (0.01) financial 0.17 (0.15)
job complexity health 0.03 (0.17)
low -0.49 (0.11) firm size
intermediate -0.49 (0.10) l&19 -0.16 (0.07)
occupation 20-49 -0.03 (0.07)
simple technical 0.35 (0.08) 50-99 -0.49 (0.08)
administrative 0.45 (0.08) lO(r199 -0.52 (0.08)
management 0.12 (0.13) 200-499 -0.17 (0.07)
service 0.19 (0.18) L 500 -0.03 (0.07)
commercial 0.18 (0.18) year= 1993 -0.59 (0.06)
creative 0.05 (0.25) year= 1994 -1.90 (0.06)
year= 1995 -2.25 (0.06)
log L -9,089.40
N 13,145
Note: Logit  estimate with dependent states ‘displacement’ and ‘other outflow’ (reference state). Based
on weighted FE data on ‘leaving’ workers. Workers older than 60 years or with tenure below 1 year are
excluded. Displacement is identified with ‘layoffs’ (excluding ‘layoffs during test periods’) at any firm,
and, on top of that, transitions into ‘new jobs’, ‘early retirement’ and ‘DI’ at firms with net employment
changes < -30%. Wages are real gross hourly wages (in Dutch guilders) including extra time payments,
profit shares, etcetera. Age and tenure are measured in years. ‘CAO’ refers to coverage by a collective
agreement, ‘AW’ to coverage by a mandatory extension of such an agreement. Firm size is measured by
the number of employees. Reference states are ‘male’, ‘ full-time’, ‘high job complexity’, ‘IT’, ‘no collective
wage agreement’, ‘agriculture/mining’, ‘firm with < 10 workers’, and ‘year = 1996’.
.
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Table 10: Simulated displacement and other separation probabilities (in %)
binary logit sequential logit
variable not displ. displ. stay displ. other
total population
97.5 2.5 90.8 3.6 5.6
year
1993 96.4 3.6 90.4 5.1 4.6
1994 95.4 4.6 93.1 1.6 5.3
1995 98.3 1.7 88.2 2.0 9.7
1996 95.4 4.6 90.4 3.1 6.4
gender
female 97.8 2.2 91.1 2.9 6.0
male 97.3 2.7 90.6 4.0 5.4
tenure (years)
1 95.0 5.0 82.8 7.3 9.9
2 96.1 3.9 87.2 5.5 7.3
4 97.1 2.9 90.2 4.1 5.7
1 0 98.1 1.9 92.8 2.7 4.5
20 98.7 1.3 94.1 1.9 4.0
wage agreement
CA0 97.6 2.4 90.4 3.7 6.0
AVV 97.4 2.6 90.4 4.2 5.5
no collective wage agreement 97.4 2.6 90.6 3.8 5.6
job complexity level
low 97.7 2.3 91.4 3.2 5.3
intermediate 97.6 2.4 91.0 3.4 5.6
high 96.4 3.6 88.5 5.7 5.8
education
low 97.6 2.4 90.9 3.4 5.7
intermediate 97.4 2.6 90.8 3.7 5.5
high 97.2 2.8 90.6 4.1 5.3
age b-4
20 98.2 1.8 93.8 0.0 6.2
30 96.7 3.3 91.1 4.3 4.5
40 96.8 3.2 90.6 4.2 5.3
50 97.6 2.4 90.1 3.3 6.6
wage (guilders)
1 5 94.8 5.2 83.2 7.0 9.8
20 96.6 3.4 88.1 4.8 7.1
40 98.7 1.3 94.8 1.9 3.3
50 99.1 0.9 96.1 1.1 2.7
Note: Based on logit  estimates (see Tables 7-9),  evaluated at the mean characteristics of the population
over the period 1993-1996. Displacement is identified with ‘layoffs’ (excluding ‘layoffs during test periods’)
at any firm, and, on top of that, transitions into ‘new jobs’, ‘early retirement’ and ‘DI’ at firms with net
employment changes < -30%. ‘CAO’ refers to coverage by a collective agreement, ‘AVV’ to coverage by
a mandatory extension of such an agreement.
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Table 11: Displacement by motivation and transition
all displaced workers
motivation I
1 2 3 4 5 all
transition E - E 3 0 162 1 37 230
I E-U ( 6 47 0 15 I 681
E - N 7 1 4 3 5 29
all 43 223 4 52 5 327
workers with tenure 2 1 year
motivation I
1 2 3 4 5 all
transition E - E 1 9 76 1 17 113
E - U 1 2 1 0 1 0 32
E - N 2 1 1 1 3 17
all 22 108 2 27 3 162
Note: Based on the LFS. E-E denotes job-to-job transitions, E-U denotes employment-to-unemployment
transitions, and E-N denotes employment-to-not-in-labor-force transitions. Rows correspond to self-
reported combinations of motivation for and voluntariness of transitions: 1 = ‘would have lost job
anyway’, 2 = ‘reorganization or plant closure’, 3 = ‘involuntary early retirement’, 4 = ‘DI’, and 5 =
‘voluntary disability’ (E-N only).
Table 12: Labor market state 1 year after displacement by transition
I all displaced workers
1 labor market state 1 I
E S U N M F all
transition E - E 143 0 3 1 0 0 147
E - U 17 2 27 1 0 1 48
E - N 4 0 0 18 0 0 I 22 I
I I
all 1 164 2 30 20 0 1 1 217 I
workers with tenure 2 1 year
labor market state
Note: Based on the LFS. E-E denotes job-to-job transitions, E-U denotes employment-to-unemployment
transitions, and E-N denotes employment-to-not-in-the-labor-force transitions. Furthermore, E = ‘em-
ployed’, S = ‘self-employed’, U = ‘unemployed and searching’, N = ‘not-in-labor-force’, M = ‘military
service’, and F = ‘full-time education’.
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Table 13: Reported labor market states of separated workers by net employment change
firms with net employment changes < -30%
1 layoff new job early retirement DI
% of all workers 21.9 8.4 2.8 1.3
% of outflow 41.5 16.3 5.5 2.5
other firms
layoff new job early retirement DI
% of all workers 4.5 3.0 0.6 0.4
% of outflow 43.9 28.8 5.2 3.6
Note: Based on weighted FE data. Workers older than 60 years are excluded. Also, workers with tenure
below 1 year have been excluded.
.
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Table 14: Median residual re-employment durations (weeks)
all workers
at 0 weeks at 26 weeks
~
displaced workers
at 0 weeks at 26 weeks
age (3-W
< 30 14.0 77.4
30 < . < 40 23.2 91.3
40 2 . < 50 27.2 (CQ)
2 50 Cm) (0)
daily wage (guilders)
< 80 22.0 93.2
80 5 < 110 26.6 106.9
110 5 . < 150 15.5 97.7
2 150 21.4 ((Jo)
gender
female 25.8 93.3
male 17.2 105.4
urbanization
urban 25.5 100.0
not urban 19.7 106.5
hours
3art-time 29.9 101.5
‘ml-time 18.0 107.9
marital status
narried 32.3 109.2
lot married 15.4 92.0
Note: Based on the UI data. Durations are observed in intervals and may be right-censored. Medians
are computed using the actuarial method, i.e. assuming that censoring and m-employment durations
are uniformly distributed within observational intervals. ‘co’ is used to denote medians larger than the
longest completed spell observed, i.e. that are beyond the scope of the data set.
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Table 15: MPH estimates re-employment durations
non-displaced (sanction)
sanctions/cell member
predicted size cell (E)
residual size cell (i)
log age
(log  ag42
log wage
(log wage)2
right censored wage
female
urban
part-time
married
Vl
V9
estimate (s.e.)
-0.18 (0.04)
0.01 (0.07)
-1.42 (0.15)
0.35 (0.05)
0.89 (0.28)
-0.93 (0.12)
0.18 (0.03)
0.09 (0.02)
-0.48 (0.15)
-0.09 (0.02)
-0.01 (0.05)
-0.00 (0.03)
-0.15 (0.03)
-2.80 (0.19)
-3.74 (0.15)
P l
P 2
L estimate (s.e.)
0.40 (0.16)
0.60 (0.16)
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
Ai
I 1ogL -40,739.8
-0.13 (0.04)
-0.26 (0.05)
-0.43 (0.06)
-0.80 (0.07)
-1.05 (0.10)
-1.05 (0.12)
T
I N I 21.079
‘$:iBlii’
Wald provinces 20.75 (11)
Note: Based on the UI data. Sector, month of inflow and province dummies are included. Cell refers
to municipality x month of inflow UI x sector - groups. The sanction rate in each cell is included as a
regressor. Also, the number of individuals in each cell is regressed on municipality, month of inflow UI,
and sector dummies, which gives predicted cell counts 2:  and residuals Z.  Age in 10 years; wage is daily
wage in referral period in 100 Dutch guilders. Wages are right censored at 430 guilders. All variables
are included in deviation from their sample means. An Information Matrix (IM) test statistic for local
parameter variation in (vi, vs),  or, equivalently, (vi, ‘us,  pi, ps), and Wald tests for the joint significance
of the 3 groups of dummies are included. All tests are asymptotically x2 distributed with the degrees of
freedom given in parentheses.
.
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Table 16: Simulated re-employment probabilities
1 Pr(t  5 26 weeks) Pr(t  < 52 weeks)
sample mean
sanction indicator
non-displaced
displaced
age b-=-s)
20
30
40
50
daily wage (guilders)
50
100
150
200
0.54 0.72
0.49 0.66
0.55 0.73
0.70 0.86
0.58 0.76
0.44 0.61
0.32 0.46
0.50 0.68
0.53 0.71
0.56 0.74
0.59 0.77
gender
female
male
0.52 0.70
0.56 0.74
urbanization
urban
not urban
hours
part-time
full-time
marital status
married
not married
0.54 0.72
0.54 0.72
0.54 0.72
0.54 0.72
0.51 0.69
0.56 0.74
Note: Probabilities are computed using the model estimates of Table 15. The first row is computed at
the mean of the regressors in the sample used for estimation, and the estimated mean of the unobserved
heterogeneity component. All other rows correspond to single deviations from this mean.
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Table .7: Changes in earnings after displacement
constant
log tenure
(log tenure)2
log age
(log agel
spell
dfiispl
dl!
dzspl
female
education
intermediate
higher
university
marriedlcohabitating
non-Dutch
tenure < 1 year
R2
all w
estimate (s.e.)
0.160 (0.036)
0.016 (0.009)
-0.004 (0.005)
-0.101 (0.053)
0.272 (0.153)
-0.008 (0.003)
-0.003 (0.033)
-0.025 (0.024)
-0.002 (0.027)
-0.022 (0.035)
-0.030 (0.056)
-0.049 (0.029)
0.024
0.078 (0.074)
lrkers
estimate (s.e.)
0.197 (0.038)
-0.011 (0.015)
0.001 (0.005)
-0.087 (0.053)
0.281 (0.153)
-0.008 (0.003)
-0.049 (0.040)
-0.024 (0.024)
-0.004 (0.027)
-0.022 (0.035)
-0.104 (0.040)
-0.029 (0.055)
-0.051 (0.029)
0.069 (0.074)
0.031
tenure 2 1 yr.
estimate (s.e.)
0.199 (0.046)
-0.025 (0.018)
0.009 (0.016)
0.002 (0.062)
0.190 (0.185)
-0.008 (0.004)
-0.050 (0.038)
-0.024 (0.030)
0.013 (0.032)
-0.043 (0.041)
-0.083 (0.068)
-0.067 (0.035)
-0.012 (0.086)
0.029
N 1069 1069 668
# displaced 168 116 116
Note: Based on the LFS. Data on all transitions between jobs with or without intervening non-
employment spells (E-E, E-U-E and E-N-E) are included. Dependent variable is the change in log real
after-tax monthly earnings between the pre- and post-separation employment spell. ‘Tenure’ is tenure on
the pre-separation job in months, and is also used to select the cases in the right panel. ‘Age’ denotes the
age at the date of the first interview in years. ‘Spell’ is the duration of the non-employment spell between
the pre- and post-separation jobs in months (0 for E-E cases). diispl is a dummy indicating whether
the separation was caused by displacement, using the definition discussed in the main text. dfiiSpl  equals
dftispl  with the additional requirement that the tenure of the displaced individual equals at least 1 year.
Reference states are ‘non-displaced’, ‘male’, ‘primary/lower education’, ‘ unmarried and not cohabitating’,
‘Dutch’, and ‘tenure 2 1 year’. ‘log tenure’, ‘log age’, and ‘spell’ are included in deviation from their
sample means. In ‘(log tenure)2’  and ‘(log age) 2’  both ‘log tenure’ and ‘log age’ are in deviation from,
their sample means, which correspond to geometric means of tenure and age equal to respectively 18.0
months and 28.9 years in the full sample and 39.8 months and 29.9 years in the tenure-restricted sample..
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